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Observer models were developed to process data in list-mode format in order to perform binary
discrimination tasks for use in an arms-control-treaty context. Data used in this study was gen-
erated using GEANT4 Monte Carlo simulations for photons using custom models of plutonium
inspection objects and a radiation imaging system. Observer model performance was evaluated and
presented using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. The ideal observer was
studied under both signal-known-exactly conditions and in the presence of unknowns such as object
orientation and absolute count-rate variability; when these additional sources of randomness were
present, their incorporation into the observer yielded superior performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear imaging systems used to reconstruct images
of treaty-accountable items (TAI) have been proposed as
a component of treaty verification between countries. A
disadvantage to the imaging techniques is that the mon-
itor can use knowledge of the detector data and imaging
system to reconstruct sensitive geometrical information
on the TAI. A physical or software information barrier
(IB) must then be used to prevent the disclosure of sen-
sitive information to unauthorized individuals or govern-
ments. An example of an IB is the CIVET system de-
veloped by Brookhaven National Laboratory [1], which
puts a high-resolution gamma spectrometer behind an
IB. Both the host and monitor can authenticate the de-
vice, but the monitor cannot access the sensitive gamma
spectra; it only sees a final decision. This makes the de-
vice expensive to develop and authenticate, for reasons
noted in the above cited paper, and ultimately reduces
confidence in the verification results. For additional ex-
amples of information barriers, we point the reader to
Sandia National Laboratories’ TRIS and TRAD systems
[2–4].
To overcome the need for an information barrier, we
have developed mathematical models (called observer
models in this work) to classify unverified test objects.
The observer models are built on acquired calibration
data from a trusted TAI and identify tested sources us-
ing raw projection data. We focused on the development
of models that process list-mode (LM) events—which we
define as the interaction of a particle in the detector. The
use, and subsequent disposal, of LM events as they are
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acquired by the system means that an “image” is never
actually formed by the imaging system either in terms
of a projection image or a reconstruction of the object.
LM processing is essential to any treaty-verification sys-
tem that does not need an IB. While these models have
been developed to perform the unique task of treaty ver-
ification, LM observers could also be extended for use
in security scanning—offering the possibility of identify-
ing threats without revealing the intimate details of the
objects themselves.
In recent years, a multitude of new classification meth-
ods have been developed, such as tree classifiers [5], sup-
port vector machines (SVM)[6], and artificial neural net-
works [7]. While the authors have not done a thorough
analysis of these models, it appears difficult to adapt
some of these routines to process LM data, which is a very
constricting condition. Random forest classifiers [8, 9] op-
erate by constructing many random decision trees (where
decisions could consist of a comparison of one of the data
variables with a number) from bootstrapped samples of
calibration data and then aggregating the tree results
to make a decision. This classifier requires the aggre-
gation of testing data to make decisions and such infor-
mation would necessitate an IB. Likewise, a non-linear
SVMs would require knowledge of the complete data set.
Only a linear SVM would satisfy the LM requirement.
Similarly, artificial neural networks cannot process LM
data because they use a nonlinear sigmoidal function af-
ter each node. The best any of these methods could do
is to approximate the Bayesian ideal observer [10], which
provides an upper bound on performance.
In this paper we choose to directly calcuate the
Bayesian ideal observer, which has complete probabilistic
knowledge of the image data and can be adjusted to pro-
cess LM data. By its nature, it offers the best possible
performance for a given task. This comes at the cost of
storing a significant amount of sensitive calibration data.
We do not view this model as a practical solution to the
IB dilemma (in fact the requirement of complete prob-
abilistic knowledge makes the ideal observer difficult to
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
01
44
9v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.d
ata
-an
]  
2 F
eb
 20
16
2create in practice), but as a case study of the optimally
performing LM observer under ideal conditions. This is
the first time the ideal observer has been used with LM
data to perform binary-discrimination tasks for the pur-
pose of hiding sensitive information. This observer will
provide an upper bound to gauge the performance of fu-
ture LM observer models that store less information. In
addition, we present results of marginalization over nui-
sance parameters such as unknown orientation and source
activity and show that inclusion of these nuisance param-
eters in our model leads to improved performance and is
often necessary.
We previously developed a signal-known-exactly
(SKE) ideal observer that processes LM data [11]. The
SKE ideal observer assumes precise knowledge of the ob-
jects being imaged (the signals) such as their orientation,
position, count rate, etc. When these parameters are not
known exactly, we refer to them as nuisance parameters,
as they prevent correct discrimination of objects but are
not of concern to the task itself. This paper generalizes
the ideal-observer theory to include the impact of these
nuisance parameters.
II. THEORY
Before beginning discussion of the observers, it is useful
to formalize the theory for LM data. Much of this nota-
tion is taken from work developed by Barrett, Parra, and
Caucci [12, 13]. Additional discussion on list-mode the-
ory and its applications can be found in work by Clarkson
[14] and Jha [15]. It is worth mentioning that there is a
fundamental difference in the motivations for their work
and this work. While they utilize LM data to prevent the
loss of information that comes with binning data, our de-
sire is to discriminate sources with LM data to prevent
the aggregation of information that would necessitate an
IB.
There are two components to the image data collected:
the number N of photons and neutrons that interact with
the detector, which is Poisson distributed, and the LM
data attributes An estimated for each detected event.
Each An contains all of the detectable information for
the nth observed particle. For a coded-aperture imager
(to be discussed later) this data can be defined as
An = {particle type, pixel number, energy deposited},
(1)
where n goes from 1 to N . Though we use a specific
imager in our experiments, the methods developed here
should apply regardless of the chosen detection system
as long as the system can generate LM data.
Nuisance parameters are potential sources of variabil-
ity that affect the data acquired, but are not of interest
for performing the task. Incorporation of nuisance pa-
rameters into our observer model helps compensate for
the performance losses these unknowns introduce. Some
nuisance parameters, such as object orientation or loca-
tion, apply to all objects being imaged. Other nuisance
parameters, such as variations in gamma or neutron in-
tensities or energy distributions, which may be caused by
unknown material compositions or ages, could be object-
dependent. We define γj as the set of of nuisance param-
eters, e.g.,
γj = {object orientation, object location, source age},
(2)
where the index j is used to denote the object type. In
this work j can be either 1 or 2 since we are considering
discrimination tasks between two object classes.
The ideal observer [10] is defined as
Λ({An}, N) = pr({An}, N |H2)
pr({An}, N |H1) , (3)
where pr(·) denotes a probability density function (pdf),
H2 denotes the hypothesis that object 2 is being imaged,
and H1 the hypothesis that object 1 is being imaged.
We distinguish between pr(·) and a discrete probability
function Pr(·) with capitalization, though we recognize
that in (3), the arguments are a mixture of discrete and
continuous random variables and we chose to use the pr
notation in these cases. The ideal observer thresholds the
likelihood ratio to make decisions and declare the data
from class 1 or class 2. Note that the likelihood includes
the LM data as well as the number of detected events N ,
which is not LM data, as it requires accumulating infor-
mation (the event count) over many events. Though not
explicitly stated in the above equation, the likelihoods
and ideal observer developed in this work are dependent
on acquisition time.
A. Signal-Known-Exactly Ideal Observer
The SKE ideal observer assumes that the nuisance pa-
rameters are known and thus the likelihood ratio is given
by
ΛSKE({An}, N |γ1, γ2) = pr({An}, N |γ2, H2)
pr({An}, N |γ1, H1) . (4)
We start by developing a LM form for the SKE likeli-
hoods used in (4). This derivation will closely follow
a prior discussion of the subject [11]. Under a known
set of nuisance parameters the likelihood that the data
({An}, N) is due to object j is
pr({An}, N |γj , Hj) = pr({An}|N, γj , Hj)Pr(N |γj , Hj).
(5)
The first term is a continuous probability density on ob-
serving some set of LM data given full knowledge of the
source nuisance parameters. The second term is a Pois-
son probability on the number of counts observed. As
each event is independent, (5) can be written as
pr({An}, N |γj , Hj) = Pr(N |γj , Hj)
N∏
n=1
pr(An|γj , Hj),
(6)
3where the last term pr(An|γj , Hj) is the probability of
observing the LM event data An given that object j is
being imaged and with known nuisance parameters γj .
The Poisson probabilities depend on the mean count
rate for events originating from the object being imaged
(the source) N
(s)
j and the mean count rate for events
originating outside the object (called background events)
N
(b)
, both of which depend on the set of nuisance pa-
rameters γj . We define the overall mean count rate for
hypothesis Hj as N j = N
(s)
j +N
(b)
. In (5) we can replace
Pr(N |γj , Hj) with a Poisson probability with mean N j ,
i.e., Pr(N |N j).
To make sense of the second term, pr(An|γj , Hj), we
next define a variable hn that describes the origin of the
nth detected particle. To do so, we include the probabil-
ity that an event is a background event (hn = h
(b)) or
a source event (hn = h
(s)). Including these conditional
probabilities in our LM term,
pr(An|γj , Hj) =
pr(An|γj , hn = h(b))Pr(hn = h(b)|γj , Hj)+
pr(An|γj , Hj , hn = h(s))Pr(hn = h(s)|γj , Hj),
(7)
where Pr(hn = h
(b)|γj , Hj) is the probability that the
detected event came from the background, and Pr(hn =
h(s)|γj , Hj) = 1 − Pr(hn = h(b)|γj , Hj) the probabil-
ity that the detected event originated from the source.
These probabilities are equal to the ratio between the
mean number of background or signal counts and the to-
tal mean number of counts. The dependence of the LM
data for a background event on Hj was dropped because
the background distribution will be the same for either
object being imaged.
We have thus far expanded the likelihoods found in the
numerator and denominator of (4) to include a Poisson
term on the total detected counts, terms which account
for the probability of a background or a source event (an-
other nuisance parameter related to the count rate), and
the probability density of observing LM data for a source
event and a background event. These last two probabili-
ties include the distribution of where an event will occur
in the detector (i.e., the imaging aspect of the system)
as well as the distribution associated with the energy of
the event (i.e., the spectral aspect of the system). These
distributions must be determined either through calibra-
tion or through Monte Carlo simulations; we discuss our
method for calculating these distributions later in this
paper.
Replacing the likelihoods in (4) with the discussed ex-
pressions reveals that
ΛSKE({An, }, N |γ1, γ2) =
Pr(N |N2)
Pr(N |N1)
N∏
n=1
pr(An|γ2, H2)
pr(An|γ1, H1) .
(8)
Both the numerator and denominator inside the product
utilize the background and source decomposition shown
in (7).
Current implementation of this SKE ideal observer oc-
curs in two stages. First, in the calibration stage, a pair of
high-statistics simulated LM detector data sets are gen-
erated for two different sources. These data sets are used
to find Nj and are binned by energy and pixel number
to find a probability density on observing the LM data
pr(An|γj , Hj). In practice, the observer model would
then be evaluated on different training data sets, yield-
ing probability distributions on the test statistic for each
of the two objects. A threshold would then be chosen for
optimal decision making.
Second, in the testing stage, the test statistic Λ is ini-
tialized to one. For each detected event, the test statistic
is multiplied by the ratio of observing that event’s data
An given the two hypotheses and the known nuisance pa-
rameters. That data An is then forgotten. At the end
of the acquisition time, Λ is multiplied by the ratio of
the probabilities for observing N counts under the two
hypothesis. Note that the recording of N particles is not
strictly LM data. Finally, Λ is thresholded to make a
decision.
The choice to compute the test statistic rather than the
individual likelihoods was made for computational ease.
The LM probabilities used in this model are often very
small (the smaller the bin size, the lower the probability
values will be). Calculation of an individual likelihood
expression such as pr(An, N |γ1, H1) is difficult as it is
the product of small numbers and goes to zero computa-
tionally after a handful of list-mode events. This can be
overcome through the use of log likelihoods, or by track-
ing only the test statistic. We chose to just track the
test statistic, multiplying it by the probability ratio of
observing a given detected particle for each of the two
hypothesis. This ratio is generally close to one, allowing
a large number of events can be processed.
Finally, we note that the SKE ideal observer requires
storage of both spatial and spectral information. In our
treaty-verification application, this information could be
used to determine sensitive isotopic and spatial informa-
tion about the object. Therefore, storage of this calibra-
tion data would need to be behind an IB.
B. Ideal Observer Incorporating Nuisance
Parameters
When the nuisance parameters γ1 and γ2 are not
known exactly, the likelihood expressions in the ideal ob-
server must be integrated over the probability densities
of those nuisance parameters. (3) becomes
Λ({An}, N) =
∫
pr({An}, N |γ2, H2)pr(γ2)dγ2∫
pr({An}, N |γ1, H1)pr(γ1)dγ1 . (9)
The probability density on the LM data {An} is con-
ditioned on knowledge of the nuisance parameters and
4then averaged over the distribution of the nuisance pa-
rameters. This expression can be evaluated in different
ways depending on the form the likelihood takes and the
number of nuisance parameters integrated over.
Monte Carlo sampling of the integrals in the numera-
tor and denominator offers the most straightforward so-
lution, but proves difficult in instances where the numer-
ator and denominator are both very close to zero com-
putationally. This can be circumvented by using the log
likelihood. For a sampled γj,n (where n goes from 1 to
the number of Monte Carlo samples) from a distribution
pr(γj), the value log(pr({An}, N |γj,n, Hj)) can be calcu-
lated. To proceed without the storage of LM data, all
samples of γj must be taken before the data is processed,
and each log likelihood expression updated as the LM
data is read in. At the end, a common factor is sub-
tracted from both numerator and denominator of (9),
and the terms are re-exponentiated and added. This pro-
cedure makes the problem computationally feasible. In
testing, the method generally requires storage of the in-
dividual likelihood values pr({An}, N |γj , Hj) for each of
the two sources and chosen samples of γj .
The incorporation of nuisance parameters brings a
practical concern. The dependence of the true detected
spatial and energy distributions on certain nuisance pa-
rameters is complex. In order to use the ideal observer
in practice, the host country would need to image their
TAIs under many different conditions in order to properly
train the ideal observer. While the nuisance parameter
priors discussed in this section were continuous, in real-
ity they would likely need to be treated as discrete. In
addition, the host would need to investigate the objects
themselves to properly identify the prior distributions.
Any deviation between the prior distributions chosen by
the host and the distribution of those nuisance parame-
ters when the monitor is testing the objects will degrade
performance.
Monte Carlo integration proved sufficient to evaluate
the likelihoods for the experiments we chose to perform
in this paper as only one nuisance parameter was treated
at a time. As the dimensionality of the nuisance pa-
rameters γ1 and γ2 increases, evaluation of this integral
through standard Monte Carlo methods becomes diffi-
cult due to slow convergence [16]. This can be improved
through Quasi-Monte Carlo methods, but a faster tech-
nique to calculate this integral is Markov-Chain Monte
Carlo [17]. Markhov-Chain Monte Carlo integration con-
tinuously resamples the nuisance parameters based on
a proposal density pr(γj,new|γj,old), accepting the new
evaluation when pr(An, N |γj , Hj) increases and reject-
ing the step with a certain probability when the likeli-
hood decreases. To use this method while keeping the
LM requirement, the probability of observing our data
would need to be calculated over a predefined grid on
the nuisance parameter values. The proposal density on
the sampled nuisance parameter values would also need
to be discrete due to the argument made in the prior
paragraph.
In the following section, we derive another method for
evaluating (9) using posterior probabilities on the nui-
sance parameters, with its own advantages and disad-
vantages.
C. Ideal Observer Using Posterior Probability
Density
The following is similar to a derivation by Kupinski in
a previous paper [18]. Before beginning, we make a slight
notational change for convenience. The symbol γ0 is now
the set of nuisance parameters shared by source 1 and
2, such as variability in background activity, orientation,
and location. The symbols γ1 and γ2 will now be used
to describe the nuisance parameters unique to sources 1
and 2, such as the material composition of each source if
not exactly known. (9) now becomes
Λ({An}, N) =∫ ∫
pr({An}, N |γ0, γ2, H2)pr(γ0)pr(γ2)dγ0dγ2∫ ∫
pr({An}, N |γ0, γ1, H1)pr(γ0)pr(γ1)dγ0dγ1 .
(10)
Beginning with (10), we simplify the denominator back
to pr({An}, N |H1) and marginalize the numerator over
the remaining nuisance parameters γ1,
Λ({An}, N) = 1
pr({An}, N |H1)
×
∫ ∫ ∫
pr({An}, N |γ0, γ2, H2)...
pr(γ0)pr(γ1)pr(γ2)dγ0dγ1dγ2.
(11)
Next, multiply both the numerator and the denom-
inator inside the integral by the SKE likelihood for
source 1, pr(An, N |γ0, γ1, H1), and acknowledge that
pr(An, N |γ0, γ2, H2)/pr(An, N |γ0, γ1, H1) for a specific
γ1 and γ2 is the SKE observer as in (8),
Λ({An}, N) = 1
pr({An}, N |H1)
×
∫ ∫ ∫
ΛSKE({An}, N |γ0, γ1, γ2)
pr({An}, N |γ0, γ1, H1)pr(γ0)pr(γ1)
pr(γ2)dγ0dγ1dγ2.
(12)
Next we simplify further using Bayes’ rule, creating a
posterior probability density,
pr(γ0, γ1|{An}, N,H1) =
pr({An}, N |γ0, γ1, H1)pr(γ0)pr(γ1)
pr({An}, N |H1) .
(13)
Substituting (13) into (12), we arrive at the final result,
Λ({An}, N) =
∫
ΛSKE({An}, N |γ0, γ1, γ2)pr(γ2)
pr(γ0, γ1|{An}, N,H1)dγ0dγ1dγ2.
(14)
5This integral can be evaluated by sampling the nui-
sance parameters γ0 and γ1 from the posterior density
pr(γ0, γ1|{An}, N,H1) and the γ2 nuisance parameters
from their respective probability densities and perform-
ing Monte Carlo integration. This provides an advantage
over (9) because the SKE ideal observer is generally more
computationally feasible than the individual likelihoods
and doesn’t require the use of log likelihoods. Another
advantage to this method is that the posterior pdf pro-
vides a distribution on γ0, γ1 values more consistent with
the data ({An}, N) than a simple Monte Carlo sample.
The integral should therefore converge faster.
However, the posterior pdf is different for each data set
({An}, N). Computing the posterior pdf in (13) requires
evaluating the likelihood pr({An}, N |γ0, γ1, H1) over a
large number of points on the γ1, γ0 nuisance parameter
grid without knowing in advance what ({An}, N) are in
order to avoid storage of the LM data. In the end, we are
uncertain this method will provide a significant speed in-
crease as a similar number of grid points may be required
to evaluate (14) as samples needed to effectively evaluate
(9).
Regardless of the approach chosen, the ideal observer
would need to store many sets of calibration data un-
der different object configurations in order to incor-
porate nuisance parameters, increasing storage require-
ments and complexity of operations behind an IB.
III. SIMULATION
A. Objects and Imager
Binary classification tasks were performed using in-
spection objects developed by Idaho National Laboratory
(INL) [19]; this paper uses inspection objects labeled 8
and 9 (see Fig. 1), which are referred to here as IO8
and IO9. These objects differ in their shielding mate-
rial, causing a difference in the gamma spectra in the
image data. The simulated detector is a fast-neutron
coded-aperture imager (see Fig. 2), developed by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory and Sandia National Labora-
tories [20]. Though this detector is designed to observe
neutrons, it also serves as a low-resolution gamma detec-
tor.
B. Forward Model in GEANT4
We developed a Monte Carlo transport application
that uses the GEANT4 toolkit [21, 22] to model gam-
mas emitted by the source objects, as well as the detec-
tor response to the emitted radiation. Due to similari-
ties in the geometry between the two objects, neutrons
were not incorporated in this study as the spectral and
spatial detector data differences between the two stud-
ied objects were expected to be minimal. A linear en-
ergy bias, as well as a low-energy cutoff of 100 keV were
FIG. 1. IO8 and IO9 developed by INL [19]. IO8 is plutonium
shielded by depleted uranium (DU) while IO9 is plutonium
shielded by highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Both assemblies
are supported by an aluminum framework inside an 8”×8”×
8” aluminum box that is 1” thick.
FIG. 2. Fast-neutron coded-aperture imaging system. The
imager uses a polyethylene coded aperture and a 4 × 4 ar-
ray of liquid-scintillator detectors, each consisting of 10× 10
(1 cm)2 pixels. A quarter-inch lead plate (not pictured) is
positioned in front of the pixelated detectors, blocking low-
energy gammas.
used to make the simulations computationally feasible.
A detector-response code collects the light output, ap-
plies an energy smear specific to the detector, and bins
it into a mean pixel location; a perfect pulse-shape dis-
crimination between gammas and neutrons was assumed.
Visualization of our GEANT4 simulation is shown in Fig.
3.
To simulate object orientations, we used a method de-
veloped by Arvo [23] that uses three random numbers
between zero and one to generate random rotations of
an object. The object is first rotated a random amount
around the zˆ axis using the first number; then the zˆ axis
is rotated to a random location in φ, θ space using the
last two. To generate stratified samples, we used evenly
spaced values of the three random numbers stated in
6FIG. 3. Geant4 model of system. IO8 is stored inside alu-
minum cube on the left (grey). The polyetheylene mask is
shown in yellow and the grey geometries in the mask are holes.
On the right is the detector.
Arvo’s work. Three initial rotations around zˆ were cho-
sen. Then zˆ was rotated into twenty different points (five
in φ, four in θ) on the sphere for sixty total orientations.
In the studies in the experiments section, a stated rota-
tion number x1x2x3 corresponds to Arvo random num-
bers x1/3, x2/5, x3/4. As an example, Arvo rotation 111
corresponds to Arvo random numbers 1/3,1/5, and 1/4.
The gamma-ray detection rates and energy spectra
present the most significant difference between the two
sources because of the shielding components (see Fig.
4) The plotted spectra in this figure are for Arvo num-
bers 111. The spectral disparity is due to the difference
in shielding material, as HEU has a high intensity at
186 keV and DU a moderate intensity at 1001 keV. Both
the detected spectra and count rate are dependent on the
orientation chosen, though the count rate varies more sig-
nificantly with orientation.
100 200 300 400 500 600 7000
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Energy (keV)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
IO8 orent. 111, det. rate = 487/s
IO9 orient. 111, det. rate = 401/s
FIG. 4. Comparison of IO8 and IO9 gamma spectra for an off-
axis orientation (Arvo numbers 111) that is representative of
the majority of orientations of the objects. IO9 energy spec-
trum is shifted towards lower energies with the more active
HEU shielding material.
C. Background
The gamma radiation background spectrum was gen-
erated using the Gamma Detector and Response Soft-
ware (GADRAS)[24]. Because GADRAS does not in-
clude liquid scintillators in its list of detector materials,
a plastic scintillator was created that best modeled the
known physical properties of the liquid scintillator in our
detector. Spectral templates for this geometry were cre-
ated for 1.01% K40 (from the earth’s mantle), 10 ppm
of thorium, and 5 ppm of uranium (both from soil). Us-
ing these templates, background spectra can be created
for different outdoor locations. An example gamma-ray
background is shown in Fig. 5. This background spec-
trum was applied to all pixels.
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FIG. 5. Background spectrum created with 2.60% K40, 3.49
ppm of uranium, and 11.09 ppm of thorium.
D. Experimental Outline
For each object, calibration data was simulated for
multiple orientations to develop the H2 and H1 prob-
abilities needed to evaluate the observer models. Testing
data was independently simulated from another orienta-
tion. The observer models acted on this testing data,
returning a scalar value.
E. Evaluating Performance
The metric chosen to evaluate the models was the area
under the ROC curve (AUC) [25]. We chose this metric
because we are not immediately concerned with where
to set the test-statistic threshold in the observer stud-
ies due to unknown costs associated with incorrect out-
comes. Generally, the AUC increases along with the ac-
quisition time. In particular, we will occasionally point
out the number of counts corresponding to an AUC of
0.9 to give an easy objective comparison.
7Rather than laboriously generating the ROC curve for
each observer, we used the two-alternative forced-choice
test (2AFC) [26] to calculate the AUC metric. With
this method, the observer is presented with a series of
pairs of testing datasets. In each pair, one dataset is
from a measurement of source 1, and the other is from a
measurement of source 2. For each dataset, the observer
calculates a test statistic (e.g. Λ in (8)) that is intended
to have a higher value for source 2 than for source 1.
The AUC is equivalent to the fraction of the time that
the source 2 test statistic is greater. In studies that incor-
porate nuisance parameters, the nuisance parameters are
randomly sampled for their respective distributions, data
sets are generated from those nuisance parameters, and
the 2 AFC test is performed to find the AUC value. For
a more detailed discussion of 2AFC studies and a proof
that the percentage correct in a 2AFC study is equal to
the AUC, we refer the reader to reference [26].
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Performance of the observer models discussed in this
section is task-dependent. In this case, distinguishing
IO8 and IO9 is a fairly easy task due to differences in
their gamma spectra and count rate, as shown in Fig. 4.
It should be noted that the methods used in this paper
can be used to study the importance of particular nui-
sance parameters. In the following sections, we evaluate
the effect that different nuisance parameters have on task
performance and how properly accounting for these nui-
sance parameters can maximize task performance. From
this methodology, the host could build a list of nui-
sance parameters critical to task performance that must
be accounted for. Likewise, a performance analysis can
demonstrate what nuisance parameters could be ignored.
These simulations were carried out with a few signif-
icant assumptions. The background was assumed to be
spatially independent on the detector, so each pixel re-
ceived the same mean count rate and spectra due to the
background. Perfect PSD was assumed, meaning there
was no misclassification of gammas as neutrons. More
complicated detector effects such as pile up or dead time
were ignored. Aside from the stated nuisance parameter
studied in each model, no further nuisance parameters
were assumed. The reason multiple nuisance parameters
were not considered in any of the studies is due to compu-
tational expediency—the simulation of data sets is a time
consuming process, and the number of data sets needed
increases exponentially with the number of nuisance pa-
rameters.
The objects were imaged with their vertical axis in
construction aligned with the imaging axis. The detector
system was simulated with a source to mask distance
of 70.5 cm, mask to detector distance of 60 cm, mask
element size of 1.21 cm and mask thickness of 6.95 cm.
0 200 400 600
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B Det. Rate ≈ 0/s
B Det. Rate = 1170/s
FIG. 6. The SKE observer was applied when both the cali-
bration and testing data from sources IO8 and IO9 are from
the same orientation. With a weak background, the observer
shows extremely good performance. When the background to
signal ratio is more realistic, about 4 times as many counts
are required for an AUC of 0.9.
A. SKE Ideal Observer with Varying Background
Strength
This simulation study is analogous to a real world ex-
periment where the monitor is attempting to discrimi-
nate IO8 and IO9 with known orientation and location
under multiple background strengths. The goal here is
to analyze performance of the SKE ideal observer ((8))
when the testing data is of the same orientation that
the observer model was trained on. Calibration data for
IO8 and IO9 with Arvo rotation 111 was used to de-
velop the parameters N1, N2 and the probability densi-
ties pr(An|γ1, H1) , pr(An|γ2, H2) in the SKE ideal ob-
server. Testing data for IO8 and IO9 were simulated
under the same conditions, and the AUC was found for
a given mean number of detected signal counts (propor-
tional to acquisition time).
Performance with a very weak (close to 0 counts per
second) and realistic background (1170 counts per sec-
ond) is shown in Fig. 6. In the weak background case,
only 45 signal counts are required for an AUC of 0.9,
while in the realistic background case, 180 signal counts
were required. This study shows strong performance of
the LM ideal observer under SKE conditions in this task
and serves as the baseline for upcoming studies incorpo-
rating nuisance parameters.
B. Ideal Observer with Orientation Variability
Here we assume that objects of an unknown orientation
are put inside a container and are imaged by the detector,
with every orientation of the source equally likely. The
goal of this experiment is to classify sources regardless of
their orientation. A total of 60 evenly-spaced orientations
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FIG. 7. When the testing data is taken from a different orien-
tation than the SKE ideal observer was derived, performance
declines. Averaging over the orientation nuisance parameter
in the observer model improves performance.
of the objects were imaged in accordance with section 3B.
The Bayesian prior for the nuisance parameter was built
assuming each of these orientations was equally likely.
The assumption in this section is that the tested sources
have the same pdf on the orientation nuisance parameter
as the training sources. These studies were done with the
strong background. We discuss two separate studies.
The first study (see Fig. 7) highlights the benefits
of including the nuisance parameters in the observer
model. An SKE ideal observer was found for the sim-
ulated sources with Arvo rotation 000. It was used to
discriminate IO8 and IO9 testing data using the 2 AFC
test for Arvo rotation 000—as opposed to rotation 111 in
the prior section—and performance in this task is very
strong. This model was then used to classify IO8 and IO9
data under rotation 111, and the observer performs worse
than the guessing observer. These two orientations offer
the most extreme disparity between the two sources, and
predictably performance is quite poor in the case where
the observer and testing data are mismatched. The ob-
server model that averaged over all 60 orientations as in
(9) was then used to discriminate simulated IO8 and IO9
data sets under each orientation. Performance improves
upon using the observer that accounts for both orienta-
tions when classifying data from the 111 rotation.
In the second study, rather than look at an individual
orientation for the testing data, the testing data was ran-
domly sampled from one of the 60 orientations. Here we
see that an observer developed from the 000 orientation
performs worse than the guessing observer in classifying
all of the training data orientations, while the 111 rota-
tion, whose data is more representative of most of the
60 rotations, performs fairly well. As expected, perfor-
mance is best when the observer model that averages
over the orientation nuisance parameter acts on the ran-
domly sampled testing data, as in Fig. 8. This study
emphasizes that while strong (but non-optimal) perfor-
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FIG. 8. Performance varies significantly when using just a
single orientation for IO8 and IO9 calibration data in the
observer model to discriminate these sources when testing a
random orientation. The observer integrating over all orien-
tations performs the best.
mance can be retained without properly accounting for
nuisance parameters, it is subject to the chosen nuisance
parameter value or prior density on which the observer
is built.
C. Ideal Observer with Count-Rate Variability
This section presents a practical implementation of the
observer model derived in the posterior pdf theory sec-
tion. This study represents a real-life scenario where a
set of sources were created with the same geometry (and
thus all should be classified as the same source) but with
different emission rates. The observer assumes that there
is a spread on activity rates, leading to a probability den-
sity over N1 and N2. A variable background strength is
also accounted for in this study, and its corresponding
detection rate Nb is an example of a shared nuisance pa-
rameter γ0. The practical implementation of (14) in this
instance is
Λ({An}, N) =
∫ ∫ ∫
ΛSKE({An}, N |Nb, N1, N2)
pr(Nb, N1|{An}, N,H1)pr(N2)
dNbdN1dN2.
(15)
IO8 and IO9 calibration data from Arvo rotation 000 was
read in and the observed count rate (CR) was assumed
to be the mean of a normal pdf with a standard devia-
tion equal to 40% of the mean. Sample data was found
through randomly sampling the mean number of counts
on each pixel according to this posterior density. In Fig.
9, we see that just using the initial single set of calibra-
tion data, the observer model does a poor job classifying
IO8 and IO9 objects with varying count rate, with an
AUC value that flattens out around 0.9 from 100 to 500
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FIG. 9. Performance of the SKE observer (known CR) de-
clines when a range of source activity rates among the testing
objects is assumed. Performance improves upon using the
ideal observer that averages over the CR nuisance parameter
((15)) with the correct probability density on the CR.
signal counts. Using the observer model that incorpo-
rates count-rate variability in the above equation, we are
able to achieve better performance.
V. CONCLUSION
This work lays the foundation to identify nuclear
sources using LM data in an observer framework. The
ideal observer models developed here can be used to in-
corporate most source-dependent nuisance parameters.
Performing binary discrimination under SKE conditions
with known values for the nuisance parameters will lead
to the best performance, but as object variability is in-
corporated in testing, performance of the SKE ideal ob-
server declines, sometimes significantly. Including all
possible nuisance parameters in these models will lead
to the best possible results in performing realistic two-
source discrimination problems. However, some nuisance
parameters will have a limited or negligible effect on per-
formance in certain tasks, such as the azimuthal angle
orientation in a rotationally symmetric object.
While this work provides a foundation for models that
use LM data, there is more to study. The ideal observer
requires significant storage that necessitates an IB to pre-
vent the monitor from accessing the sensitive calibration
data. The monitoring party’s inability to access that data
would likely make it reluctant to agree to such a model
in a treaty-verification setting. We are investigating a
linear observer model that penalizes performance based
on sensitive information, offering a method to discrimi-
nate between objects while not storing information that
can be used to reconstruct certain parameters. In addi-
tion, binary classification tasks are not ideal for treaty
verification. N-source discrimination observers and null
hypothesis tests will be studied.
To accurately predict task performance, the forward
model and object scene would also need to be made more
physically realistic. The GEANT4 simulations did not
include any other objects in the environment such as a
floor or walls; hence more scattered particles would be
detected in a real-life experiment than these simulations,
which would likely make the task more difficult. In ad-
dition, imperfect pulse-shape discrimination was ignored
here. In practice, photons and neutrons are discrimi-
nated based on a measure of their delayed fluorescence
[27], but classification is imperfect results in misclassifi-
cation of neutrons as gamma rays.
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